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EU sports law: A uniform algorithm for regulatory rules 
 




In applying the EU economic provisions to the regulatory rules in sport, four different 
categories of “sporting exception” can be discerned in the jurisprudence of the Court. They 
include sporting rules that do not produce any economic effect, ‘purely sporting’ rules, inherent 
rules, and objectively justified rules. Based on the existing parameters of the EU sports law and 
policy, this article advances arguments in support of discarding the nuances in the Court’s 
analytical approach to sporting exception. Ordinary EU law, coupled by the concept of 
specificity of sport that is now included in Article 165(1) TFEU, already contains the all-
encompassing, uniform analytical structure apt to accommodate all categories of regulatory 
rules in sports. In addition, the proposed uniform framework can be utilised to justify the 
challenged sporting rules in both internal market law and competition law, thus avoiding 
duplication of analysis. This is enabled by the high degree of convergence in their application 
to the rules of private regulatory bodies. 
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The relationship between sport and EU law has steadily progressed over the past forty years. It 
moved from virtually apologetic ruling in Walrave (1974) that sport is subject to EU law “only 
in so far as it constitutes an economic activity” to a confident elucidation in Meca-Medina 
(2006) that any condition for engaging in sporting activity may offend against the EU law. It 
was the Court’s decision in Bosman (1995) coinciding with the commercialisation of the 
industry that sparked policy discussions that focused on whether sport deserves a special 
treatment in the application of the TFEU economic provisions. In 2007 the Commission 
published White Paper on Sport accompanied by the Commission Staff Working Document, 
the most influential and comprehensive policy initiative thus far. It includes the Union acquis 
pertaining to the sports sector, sets out the general approach, and increases the transparency in 
relationship between sport and EU law.  
 
Throughout this development of EU sports law and policy one of the most pertinent questions 
concerned the scope and content of sporting exception, i.e., the special treatment given to sports 
in the application of the EU economic provisions necessitated by certain specificities of the 
sector. This question received a heightened importance in the EU policy discussions after the 
Bosman judgement in 1995. Today, four types of sporting exceptions can be identified in the 
Court jurisprudence, each being subject to a different analytical framework depending on the 
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nature of restriction in question.  They include sporting rules that do not produce any economic 
effect, “purely sporting” rules, inherent rules, and objectively justified rules. Whereas 
constructing these structural nuances might have been useful initially to clarify the approach in 
the sporting sector, discarding them would make more sense today. Standard application of EU 
competition and internal market law to regulatory rules of private bodies, coupled by the (now 
constitutional) requirement to take into account the specificity of sport in the implementation 
of EU law, already contains the all-encompassing, uniform analytical framework apt to 
accommodate all categories of sporting rules. The core of this article rests with the premise that 
such uniform algorithm is preferable and should be utilised henceforth to the exclusion of any 
former distinctions between different categories of sporting exceptions. But before moving on 
to this discussion, the concept of specificity of sport and the application of the law as it stands 
today will be set out.  
 
2. Specificity of sport in EU law and policy 
 
Sports governing bodies are formally private entities occupying a monopolistic position in one-
federation-per-sport pyramidal structures typical of most European sports. The self-governing 
model with a degree of political, legal, financial and pyramidal autonomy akin to the public 
entities, allows them to organise and regulate their respective sport in the way they see fit. The 
rules and regulations they adopt control the conduct within their disciplines, including athletes’ 
professional lives, clubs’ match calendars, and many aspect of clubs’ business affairs and 
finances. This wide scope of regulatory latitude had by the sports governing bodies is not 
unfettered: in EU policy it is conditional upon their compliance with the EU law.1 In practice, 
however, lobbying strategies, out-of-court settlements and development of internal dispute 
settlement mechanisms have served sports governing bodies in alleviating the impact of EU 
law.2 
The duty to comply with the EU law is matched by the corresponding duty of the Union to take 
into account the specificities of the sporting sector in the implementation of common policies. 
Some of the most distinctive of those specificities include mutual interdependence between 
clubs to produce a game integrated into wider championship race as the only marketable 
product; preserving competitive balance between clubs in order to increase the uncertainty of 
results;3 financial solidarity between competing adversaries and between professional and 
amateur levels of the game; transient nature of the industry,4 and; significant social, cultural 
and educational function performed by sport. 
                                                 
1 Commission Staff Working Document, The EU and Sport: Background and Context, Accompanying Document 
to the White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391 final, para 4.1. 
2 Geeraert, Mrkonjic and Chappelet, “A rationalist perspective on the autonomy of international sport governing 
bodies: towards a pragmatic autonomy in the steering of sports”, 7:4 International Journal of Sport Policy and 
Politics, (2015) 473-488, at 476. 
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Sport (Edward Elgar 2009), 77-89, at 79.  
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It is essential that the personal or commercial assets are used in timely fashion - otherwise the possibility of their 
exploitation is lost. 
In December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty amendments gave complementary competence to the 
Union in the area of sport,5 and introduced the concept of “specificity of sport” in Article 165(1) 
TFEU. This article states that “[t]he Union shall contribute to the promotion of European 
sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on 
voluntary activity and its social and educational function” [emphasis added]. The Commission 
Communication on Developing European Dimension in Sport interprets the specificity of sport 
in Article 165(1) TFEU as the concept encompassing “all the characteristics that make sport 
special […]”.6 The first reference to Article 165(1) TFEU was made by the Grand Chamber of 
the Court in Bernard,7 even though the facts of the case pre-dated the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. Thus, the reference was largely symbolic as it merely reinforced already existing 
judicial possibilities and Article 165(1) TFEU added little further protection for contested sports 
rules beyond those already provided by the Court and the Commission - the two institutions 
have already been highly receptive of the “specific nature of sport” concept.8 
Some examples of the objectives specific to the sporting community accepted as legitimate so 
far have been ensuring regularity of competitions,9 maintaining the competitive balance 
between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results10, 
encouraging the recruitment and training of young players,11 combating doping in order for 
competitive sport to be conducted fairly, objectively, and ethically,12 and ensuring integrity of 
competitions through prohibitions on multi-club ownership.13 However, the Commission Staff 
Working Document emphasises that each sport is different and has its specificities which 
deserve to be acknowledged under EU law. As such, the EU will not impose general rules 
applicable to all European sports.14  
The specificity of sport is therefore the very feature of the industry that brought about “sporting 
exceptions” of various kinds in EU law. The content of these exceptions is determined on case-
by-case basis. The Commission Staff Working Document on Sport and Free Movement (2011) 
states that “[e]xceptions from the EU's fundamental principles must be limited and based on 
specific circumstances”.15 
Next, we will look at the application of these principles and development of the different 
sporting exceptions in EU law.  
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 3. Four categories of sporting exception in the Court’s jurisprudence  
 
When applying the internal market laws, the Court will first assess the existence of the 
restriction on the free movement. If a restriction is not found, the case ends in favour of the 
respondent. Where a restriction is identified, the Court goes on to evaluate the existence of 
legitimate justifications for the restrictions and the proportionality of the challenged measure. 
In EU free movement law, directly discriminatory measures can only benefit for the limited list 
of express derogations in the Treaty, whereas indirectly discriminatory and non-discriminatory 
restrictions have the additional recourse to the open list of objective justifications. Sport is an 
exception to this standard of application. By allowing the directly discriminatory ‘3+2’ rule in 
Bosman,16 discriminatory transfer windows in Lehtonen,17 and quotas on foreign players in 
Kolpak18 and Simutenkov19 to be considered under the objective justification framework as 
opposed to the express derogation framework, the Court has effectively introduced the concept 
of “specificity of sport” to the traditional classification process. Sport is not the only sector in 
which the Court has taken such a detour for directly discriminatory measures,20 but it is the only 
sector where it has taken this approach consistently, thus making it a rule in the application of 
EU free movement law to sports, which can be attributed to the specificity of sport. 
 
In competition law, Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions 
by associations of undertakings or concerted practices, which are considered capable of 
affecting trade between Member States and that have as their object (i.e., subjectively intend) 
or effect (i.e., objectively cause)21 the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within 
the internal market. Ancillary restraints, while prima facie restricting competition, will after 
examination fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. As for the practices that do breach 
this provision, the fulfilment of the economic efficiency based criteria of Article 101(3) TFEU 
will be necessary for exemption. Article 102 TFEU prohibits the dominant undertakings to 
abuse their market position. An equivalent of ancillary restraints and economic efficiency 
criteria of Article 101(3) TFEU apply under Article 102 TFEU to exempt otherwise illegal 
behaviour. 
 
Parrish and Miettinen described the sporting exception in EU law as “both the removal of rules 
from the scope of these Treaty articles and the sensitive application of EU law to the sports 
sector”.22 Four categories of rules that qualify for the sporting exception in this broad meaning 
                                                 
16 Case C-415/93 Bosman. 
17 Case 176/96 Lehtonen. 
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can be identified in the examination of the Court’s jurisprudence.23 The first three are 
represented by the sporting rules that are not considered to be in breach of the Treaty, whereas 
the rules that qualify as category IV exception are restrictions that can nevertheless be justified. 
 
3.1. Category I: Sporting rules that do not produce any economic effect  
 
Category I is represented by the sporting rules that do not produce any economic effect. In 
paragraph 4 of Walrave the Court addressed and confirmed the applicability of the Treaty in 
the area of sport and held that “the practice of sport is subject to Community law only in so far 
as it constitutes economic activity […]”.24 Accordingly, the lack of economic effect is the sole 
fact that is per se sufficient to take the rule outside of the scope of the Treaty and outside of 
Union competence. Both the sporting rule and its effects must be non-economic to merit from 
this relatively limited exception in terms of its practical scope. Apart from the rules of the game 
(lex ludica)25 that are unlikely to be challenged before the courts, and sport as purely amateur 
pursuit, it is hard to imagine a rule completely devoid of any economic effect.  
In Donà, the Court specifically mentioned only professional and semi-professional players as 
subjects of protection under freedom of movement provisions.26 This implied that the rules 
applicable to amateur, non-economic activities do not fall under the protection afforded by the 
Treaty. At the same time, the “amateur athlete” designation by the sporting federation does not 
automatically exclude those covered by it from the scope of the Treaty. A functional case-by-
case rather than strictly formalistic approach will be employed in examining the existence of 
economic activity that falls under the scope of the Treaty. Thus, in Deliège the Court first said 
that “the mere fact that a sports association or federation unilaterally classifies its members as 
amateurs does not in itself mean that those member do not engage in economic activities.”27 It 
went on to set a broad criteria to determine whether an activity engaged in by the amateur athlete 
constitutes economic activity within the meaning of paragraph 4 of Walrave. Grants and 
sponsorship agreements received by the athlete, as well as the fact that participation of formally 
amateur athletes in international competitions is a source of profit for competition organisers 
were considered relevant factors in the context.  
In that sense, there is nothing special in application of EU law to sporting industry in respect to 
this category of sporting exception: any activity which does not constitute economic activity 
will fall outside the scope of the Treaty’s economic provisions. For example, in non-sporting 
cases Levin and Steymann28 the Court required that the work performed must be genuine and 
effective and not such as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary, thus clearly indicating 
the need for the requisite minimum economic effect. As such, Category I is not exactly a 
“sporting” exception, but an exception with general pertinence. It is also not exactly an 
                                                 
23 Ibid. pp 73–101.  
24 Case 36/74Walrave and Koch v. Union Cycliste Internationale and others [1974] ECR 1405. 
25 As defined by Foster, “Lex sportiva and lex ludica: The CAS’s jurisprudence” in Blackshaw, Siekmann, and 
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26 Case 13/76 Gaetano Donà v. Mario Mantero [1976] ECR 1333, para 19. 
27 Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle Deliège v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées 
ASBL, Ligue belge de judo ASBL, Union européenne de judo and François Pacquée [2000] ECR I-2549, para 
46. 
28 Case 53/81 D.M. Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Jusitie [1982] ECR 1035, para 17 and Case 196/87 Udo Steymann 
v. Staatssecretaris van Jusitie [1988] ECR 6159, para 13. 
“exception” as the rules not covered by the Treaty do not require any exception. All other 
sporting rules and practices will be scrutinised for their compatibility with the Treaty. 
Finally, it is important to note that this exception sets a generally applicable constitutional 
limitation on the conferred powers of EU institutions, and as such applies to challenges to 
regulatory rules under competition provisions as well. 
 
3.2. Category II: “Purely sporting” rules 
 
In paragraph 8 of Walrave the Court made an exception for directly discriminatory sporting 
rule on selection of athletes for national representative teams. Specifically, in regard to 
nationality discrimination as prohibited under Articles 18, 45 and 56 TFEU, the Court said that 
such prohibition “does not affect the composition of sport teams, in particular national teams, 
the formation of which is a question of purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to do 
with economic activity.” In paragraph 9 it added that “this restriction on the scope of the 
provisions in question must however remain limited to its proper objective.” Accordingly, the 
Treaty would not apply to economic sporting activities so long as the motive for the 
proportionate rules was non-economic, in other words, “purely sporting”.  
In Donà,29 the case that also concerned the composition of sport teams (albeit not national 
teams) the Court modified and restricted the rule in paragraph 8 of Walrave. The exception to 
prohibition on direct discrimination for composition of national representative teams was 
reformulated and substituted with exclusion of “foreign players from participation in certain 
matches for the reasons which are not of an economic nature, which relate to the particular 
nature and context of such matches and are thus of sporting interest only”.30 Matches between 
national teams from different countries were mentioned as an example of the kind of exclusion 
of players that will fall under Category II of sporting exception. 
Purely sporting rules are therefore the rules that: 1) produce required economic effect, 2) are 
based on non-economic, purely sporting motives, 3) relate to the particular nature and context 
of certain matches, and 4) are proportionate. 
 
Although the Court has created and used this exception in the application of free movement 
provisions, it may well be applicable (solely or simultaneously) in competition law provided 
the case has required economic effect needed to trigger the application of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. While there is a high level of convergence between competition and internal market 
articles in their application to regulatory rules, they also possess some very individual features 
which prevent the full convergence in their application to such rules. For example, purely 
internal situations are outside of the scope of internal market rules and therefore outside of 
Union competence,31 but the competition rules may apply even if the situation is wholly 
internal, as long as there is the required effect on competition. Similarly, the restriction on 
competition which does not produce an appreciable effect on the trade between Member States 
is outside of the EU competence in respect to competition provisions, but it may fall to be 
examined by the EU institutions under the free movement articles. Certain other elements such 
as undertaking, agreement or decision, dominance, service, worker, etc., further prevent the full 
                                                 
29 Case 13/76 Donà. 
30 Ibid. para 14. 
31 See, for example, Case 175/78 Regina v. Saunders [1979] ECR 1129 and Cases C-225-227/95 Kapasakalis, 
Skiathis and Kougiagakas v. Greece [1998] ECR I-4329. 
convergence between the two sets of provisions. All these individual features and conditions 
can be referred to as “required economic effects”.  
The application of the “purely sporting” rule exception is triggered by the presumption of the 
restriction of the specific Treaty provision. Such application also implies that the required 
economic effect was found to exist. The rest of the conditions for Category II exception (i.e., 
purely sporting motive, participation in certain matches, and proportionality) are exactly the 
same for internal market and competition law, and concerning those conditions, there exists full 
convergence. Once the rule satisfies the required economic effect test for application of both 
sets of provisions, it reaches the common ground for assessment of the applicability of 
conditions for exemption.  
This conclusion is valid in all but one situation: cases that involve conclusive presumptions 
under Article 101(1) TFEU. The language in paragraph 31 of Meca-Medina implies that the 
rule that already satisfied the requirements for exception under the free movement provisions 
cannot be taken to automatically satisfy those requirements under competition provisions. This 
has been interpreted by many authors as the Court’s rejection of convergence theory. However, 
this is not the case. Apart from the required economic effect that was discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs, all that the Court was suggesting is that the internal market law does not have the 
equivalent of the hard-core restrictions in Article 101(1). Under Article 101(1), if a rule 
constitutes a per se or hard-core restriction by object, it is not open to the parties to argue that 
it in fact does not amount to a restriction and the presumption of a breach of that provision is 
conclusive, as opposed to rebuttable. In that case, a rule that has satisfied all the requirements 
for the category II exception under the free movement provisions cannot benefit from the 
attempt at that exception under Article 101(1) to which it would otherwise be entitled but for 
the hard-core restrictions and conclusive presumptions of the breach. A party may rely on 
Article 101(3) but not on any of the judicially-developed exceptions available on the level of 
the restriction under Article 101(1). Conversely, if there is no conclusive presumption under 
the competition provisions, and the rule has already been regarded under internal market articles 
as “purely sporting”, that result is transplantable to competition law, with no further analysis 
being required. The paragraph 31 in Meca-Medina should be read in this light. Once there is a 
rebuttable (non-conclusive) presumption under competition articles, and the “required 
economic effect” is established under both sets of provisions, the three remaining conditions 
for exception are the same.32 
Finally, it must be mentioned that the exception for purely sporting rules does not present an 
unfamiliar legal construction in the EU law. Before Meca-Medina, it could have been 
considered as a judicially fashioned sporting equivalent to Article 45(4) TFEU exception for 
directly discriminatory measures regarding employment in the public service, due to its 
application being confined only to the context involving direct discrimination for national 
representative teams. 
 
3.3. Category III: Inherent rules 
 
The concept of inherent rules originated in internal market case Deliège in which the Court was 
asked to determine the compatibility with Article 56 (and 101 and 102) TFEU of selection rules 
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(Springer, 2015), pp 215-235. 
of governing body for judo in Belgium limiting the number of participants in the high-level 
international competitions (Olympic Games) that do not involve national teams competing 
against each other. The question forwarded to the Court was whether it was contrary to those 
articles to “require professional or semi-professional athletes, or persons aspiring to 
professional or semi-professional activity, to be authorised by their federation in order to be 
able to compete in international competition which does not involve national teams competing 
against each other”.33 
The Court first reiterated and confirmed the scope of the sporting exception as set out in 
Walrave (paragraph 4) Donà (paragraphs 14 and 15) and Bosman (paragraphs 76 and 127), but 
dismissed the applicability of both the Category I and II sporting exception. It recognised that 
unlike in Bosman the rules challenged in Deliège “do not determine the conditions governing 
access to the labour market by professional sportsmen and do not contain nationality clauses 
limiting the number of nationals of other Member States who may participate in a 
competition”.34 Selection rules at issue in the main proceedings were thus considered as non-
discriminatory rules affecting the exercise of economic activity, rather than as discriminatory 
market access rules.35 Only then it proceeded to specify that challenged rules could not in 
themselves constitute an obstacle on the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU 
because limiting the number of participants “is inherent in the conduct of an international high-
level sports event, which necessarily involves certain selection rules or criteria being 
adopted”.36 The sports organisations also must be able to demonstrate that selection rules are 
based on objective criteria unconnected with the personal circumstances of the athletes.37 
Although the Court did not explicitly mention that the inherent rules should be proportionate, 
such requirement follows from paragraph 65 of the judgment that reads 
[…]the adoption, for the purposes of an international sports tournament, of one system for 
selecting participants rather than another must be based on a large number of considerations 
unconnected with the personal situation of any athlete, such as the nature, the organisation and 
the financing of the sport concerned. 
Accordingly, the discriminatory rule would be considered disproportionate and the inherency 
test failed. In Deliège, the adoption of one system over another is left to sporting bodies and 
organisers,38 as long as the selection is made on the basis of objective factors unconnected with 
the athletes’ personal situation. The proportionality of such a system is not questioned by the 
Court as it is deemed proportionate by default. Hence, the reason that the Court did not 
specifically mention the proportionality requirement is because it is built into the concept of 
                                                 
33 Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège, para 22. 
34 Ibid. para 61. 
35 Under the “Säger formula” this would have been enough to find a breach. Para 12 of Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] 
ECR I-4221 provides that Article 56 required: “not only the elimination of all discrimination against a person 
providing services on the ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without 
distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or 
otherwise impede the activities of provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully 
provides similar services”. See on this point Miettinen and Parrish “Inherent Rules in EC Sports Law”, presented 
at the Conference on Law and Popular Culture, Onati, Spain (June 2008). 
36 Ibid. para. 64, (emphasis added). 
37 Ibid. para 65. 
38 Ibid. paras 67 and 68.  
inherency under free movement law. Only non-discriminatory (i.e. proportionate) rules that do 
not relate to market access can satisfy the inherency test under free movement provisions.39  
 
The inherency test for regulatory rules in sport under competition law articles is not sensitive 
to the difference between the discriminatory and non-discriminatory, and between market 
access and exercise of economic activity rules. Its scope is therefore broader and more flexible. 
The origins of the inherency test can be found in Wouters, a case involving regulatory rules of 
the Bar of the Netherlands, where the Court introduced an exception, characterised by Whish 
as a “regulatory ancillarity”.40 The exception essentially involves the balancing of the Union’s 
competition law objectives against the non-economic public interests that may or may not be a 
part of the Union’s objectives in other areas. The Wouters test was confirmed in Meca-Medina, 
which remains the only case involving regulatory rules in sport decided under Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU to date.41 It concerned two professional swimmers who were suspended due to the 
breach of sport’s anti-doping rules adopted by the International Olympic Committee. The 
applicants contested the rules alleging that they were in breach of the freedom to provide 
services and the competition provisions of the Treaty. The Court emphasised the need for 
contextual approach when assessing the existence of restriction under Article 101(1) TFEU: 
Not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings 
which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the 
prohibition laid down in Article [101(1) TFEU]. For the purposes of application of that 
provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which 
the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects and, more 
specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects 
restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives (Wouters and Others, 
paragraph 97) and are proportionate to them.42 
Accordingly, certain types of agreements or decisions that restrict the commercial behaviour of 
undertakings do not violate the prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU, if, because of their context 
and objectives, the restrictions in those agreements or decisions are inherent to, and 
proportionate for, the realisation of non-competition objectives.  From the scarce case law on 
regulatory ancillarity, it appears that the exception is applicable only in cases of regulatory 
restrictions imposed by collective private bodies in public interests, whether at national, 
European or global level. So far, the Court has applied it only to rules having a public law 
character deemed necessary for the proper organisation and (ethical) conduct of a certain 
profession. The fact that the doping rule was intended to safeguard the objective of fair play 
and ethics in sports did not remove it from the scope of competition rules; the economic effects 
that it produced had to be considered in the light of the Wouters inherency test and the 
requirement of proportionality. The rule was found to restrict athletes’ freedom of action, but 
as the general objective was to provide a level playing field and preserve integrity of sporting 
competition and the sanctions were necessary to ensure compliance with the doping ban, the 
                                                 
39 Miettinen and Parrish, op. cit. supra note xxx 
40 Whish, Competition Law, 6th edn. (OUP, 2009), p xxx. 
41 Case C-519/04 Meca-Medina. Before this case the Court has had a number of opportunities to clarify the relation 
between competition law and sports (notably in C-415/93 Bosman) but it has avoided this problem by deciding the 
cases on the basis of internal market rules. In the absence of Union legislative competence, it was only the 
Commission decisional practice that shed some light on the competition law issues in sports. 
42 C-519/04 Meca-Medina, para 42.  
restrictions were deemed inherent in the rule.43 The Court also found that athletes had not 
demonstrated that the rule was disproportionate.44 
The rule or practice which is found to satisfy the cumulative criteria of the test is considered 
compatible with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. One the other hand, should the rule or practice 
fail to meet any of the criteria, and it has a negative effect on trade between Member States, it 
will breach Article 101(1) TFEU and will constitute an abuse contrary to Article 102, which 
can be made valid only by satisfying the conditions for exemption common to both articles (i.e., 
Article 101(3) TFEU and the efficiency defence conditions). Here, it must be acknowledged 
that it is highly unlikely that a rule of a sporting organisation pursuing a non-competition goal 
that cannot be translated into economic efficiencies, or a rule that has failed the Meca-Medina 
test on the point of proportionality, would satisfy the requisite economic conditions.45 That 
presents raison d’être of the Meca-Medina test, for without it, the broad scope of Article 101(1) 
TFEU would likely render virtually any organisational rule of sport that restricts the freedom 
of action and relies on the non-competition justification incompatible with the entire Article 
101 TFEU. 
The Commission in its Communication did not differentiate between competition and internal 
market law when it explained that in order to assess the compatibility of sporting rules with any 
EU law, it considers 1) the legitimacy of the objectives pursued by the rules; 2) whether any 
restrictive effects of those rules are inherent in the pursuit of the objectives, and; 3) whether 
they are proportionate to them.46 So these are the common requirements under the inherency 
test for both sets of provisions, whether or not explicitly stated. According to the Commission 
Staff Working Document47, the rules that have been, or are likely to be, considered inherent 
under competition law provisions are: non-discriminatory transfer windows,48 non-
discriminatory criteria for selection of athletes for competitions,49 proportionate sanctions for 
breach of anti-doping rules,50 proportionate home-and-away rules,51 and proportionate rules 
preventing multiple ownership of clubs.52  
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3.4. Category IV: Objectively justified sporting rules 
 
Category IV comprises the only type of regulatory sporting rules that initially constitute 
restrictions, both in fact and in law. They fit into generally applicable objective justification 
framework set out in Gebhard and Kraus.53 Accordingly, those restrictive rules that pursued a 
legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and were justified by pressing reasons of public 
interest, and are compatible with the principle of proportionality do not breach the free 
movement provisions.54 Unlike in cases that concern other industries, in sport cases the Court 
utilises the Gebhard/Kraus-style framework for both directly and indirectly discriminatory 
rules.55 As Parrish and Miettinen put it, the test for objectively justified rules in sport involves 
a sensitive application of the law,56 in other words, the recognition of the specificities of the 
sports industry in the enforcement of the law. Examples of this exercise can be seen in Bosman, 
Lehtonen, and Bernard.  
 
Bosman involved a directly discriminatory “3+2” rule passed by Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA) that placed quota on clubs in fielding foreign players, and non-
discriminatory transfer fee rules which restricted the professional activities of football players. 
With regard to the latter, in view of the considerable social importance of football in the EU, 
the Court acknowledged encouraging the recruitment and training of young players and 
maintaining the competitive balance between clubs as legitimate objectives.57 The transfer fees 
were found unsuitable for the attainment of the said objectives and also failed the 
proportionality test (but only regarding the expired contracts).58 The Court also brushed aside 
the attempts to justify quotas on the basis of their alleged necessity to maintain the traditional 
link between each club and their country, to create a sufficient pool of top national players to 
be fielded in national representative team, and to maintain competitive balance between clubs.59 
The fact that the quota rule was drawn up in collaboration with the Commission did not shield 
it from judicial scrutiny or provide any guarantees as to its compatibility with the Treaty. Thus, 
it was abolished by the Court. In the light of the answers under Article 45 TFEU, it was 
unnecessary to address the questions on interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU that were 
also referred to it for a preliminary ruling.60 However, AG Lenz in Bosman entertained the 
arguments of the respondent that referred to the “rule of reason”, a concept applied in the US 
under Article 1 of the Sherman Act. While he acknowledged that Europe does not have the 
“rule of reason” doctrine and instead uses Article 101(3) TFEU as a platform for exemption 
analysis, he nevertheless found a functional equivalent that existed at the time in the form of 
the DLG case61 on commercial ancillarity, a precursor to Wouters case that contained the same 
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basic approach to assessment of legality of restrictions as the core competition test applied to 
sporting rules today.62  
 
In Lehtonen, the transfer of a basketball player did not take place within the specified one month 
period, i.e. within the so-called “transfer window” passed by the International Basketball 
Federation. A player that was not employed within the specified period could not play for his 
team in competitions for that season. Citing Bosman, the Court reiterated in paragraph 50 of 
Lehtonen that being fielded is the “essential purpose of a professional player’s activity” and the 
rules prohibiting fielding restrict the chances of being employed. Because they affected labour 
market access as opposed to the exercise of economic activity, transfer windows were not 
inherent rules, but instead restrictions to free movement that fell to be examined under the 
objective justification framework.63 The Court found them justified on non-economic grounds, 
namely the need for proper organisation of the game because mid-season transfers could 
substantially alter the sporting strength and, therefore, the competition between teams in the 
course of a championship.64 Nevertheless, transfer windows in this particular case were found 
to be disproportionate and in breach of Article 45 TFEU because they were opened substantially 
longer for the players from outside the EU, which proved that the game can be organised 
properly with longer transfer windows.65 The questions on the interpretation of competition 
provisions were considered inadmissible due to the insufficient factual information provided by 
the referring national court. Advocate General Alber in Lehtonen considered the rule prima 
facie restrictive, but adopted the DLG reasoning that necessary and proportionate rules may be 
saved from being labelled as restrictions.66  
 
In Bernard,67 a young footballer was required to pay damages for the loss suffered by the club 
that trained him. This was a method of compensation for signing his first professional contract 
with another club and, consequently, breaching his contractual obligations. The Court found 
that the compensation scheme in Bernard, while constituting neither a prohibition on signing a 
contract with a club in another Member State nor discrimination on the basis of nationality, 
nevertheless discourages the player from exercising his right of free movement by making that 
exercise less attractive.68 Much like in Bosman, the Court took into account the considerable 
social importance of sporting activities, in particular football, in the EU, and accepted the 
objective of encouraging recruitment and training of young players as legitimate.69 The social 
importance of sport played a crucial role in legitimating this objective, a feature not found in 
any other employment sector. 
The standard of application of the proportionality principle in the objective justification 
framework was set out by the Court in paragraph 40 of the Bernard case. Accordingly, when 
testing the sporting rules for their proportionality with the purported public interest objectives, 
                                                 
62 AG Lenz Opinion in C-415/93 Bosman, paras 269-270. 
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account must be taken of the specific characteristics of sport and of its social and educational 
function. This obligation on EU institutions is mentioned in identical terms in Article 165(1) 
TFEU and is therefore a constitutionally based requirement. As such, it can be said that the 
same standard applies in the interpretation and application of EU competition law to sport. In 
Murphy Advocate General Kokott was of the opinion that Articles 6(e) and 165 TFEU “require 
account to be taken of the specific nature of sport and its structures based on voluntary 
activity”70 which has been interpreted to “imply horizontal reach of Article 165 into other 
Treaty competences.”71 
These cases illustrate that the specificity of sport is properly taken into consideration in the 
application and enforcement of EU internal market law in the objective justification framework. 
The phrasing of the requirement that “account must be taken of the specific characteristics of 
sport” is broad enough to capture any and all of the sports idiosyncrasies.  
 
Although it is not as explicitly enunciated, same sporting considerations will be taken into 
account when applying EU competition law to regulatory rules in sport. This is due to not just 
the constitutionally based requirement in Article 165(1) TFEU but also because it would not be 
compatible with established case-law to utilise a different approach. The substance of the 
Category IV sporting exception for objectively justified rules is contained in the Meca-Medina 
test. Under competition provisions that test is the same as objective justification test under 
internal market, because it is not sensitive to nuances between the rules affecting market access 
(that are not capable of constituting inherent rules under internal market provisions and are 
assessed under objective justification framework) and the non-discriminatory rules affecting 
exercise of economic activities (that are capable of constituting inherent rules under internal 
market provisions). In other words, sporting rules that are subject to either inherent or 
objectively justified rule test under internal market, are subject to a single Meca-Medina test 
under competition law. This point will be further emphasised below.  
 
4. The uniform analytical framework  
 
The discussion so far lead us to the main premise of this article, which argues for the 
establishment of a uniform analytical framework under EU law for all categories of sporting 
rules. It is submitted that it ought to replace the distinct structural approaches to different 
categories of sporting rules that were created in the Court’s jurisprudence without the need to 
introduce any new elements in the general EU sports law. Adequate evaluation of those rules 
can be carried out under the objective justification framework in internal market which 
corresponds to Meca-Medina test under competition law. Such uniform structural approach is 
not just preferable for the reasons of simplicity and legal certainty, but is also called for by the 
high level of convergence between treatment of regulatory rules under competition and internal 
market. This is further coupled by arguments that both purely sporting and inherent rules can 
perfectly fit in objective justification framework that already takes into account all the sporting 
specificities. In other words, sport has carved its place in the general EU law.  
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there is no need to take Article 165 TFEU into consideration in any of the EU legislative procedures, as it is not a 
horizontal provision.  
 It remains to be acknowledged that Category I, represented by sporting rules that do not produce 
any economic effect, is not of importance for the purposes of the discussion to follow. As a 
matter of principle of subsidiarity those rules are outside of the EU competence. The remaining 
three categories that do produce economic effect can be subsumed under Category IV sporting 
exception. This involves treating purely sporting rules and inherent rules under objective 
justification framework.  
 
4.1. Purely sporting rules as objectively justified rules 
 
There are several reasons why the notion of purely sporting rule that forms category II sporting 
exception from Walrave and Donà72 should be discarded, and any challenges to the rules of 
sporting bodies previously belonging to this category should be dealt with under the single 
internal market law objective justification framework/competition law Meca-Medina 
framework.  
First, even though the notion of purely sporting rule has always been plagued with uncertainties 
as regards its scope and precise meaning, the scope of exception is “extremely narrow”.73 This 
view is in accordance with the Opinion of Advocate General Warner in Walrave that the 
exception is limited to representative nature of national teams only. The language of the Court 
would, however, indicate a wider approach as it extends the exception from the principle of 
non-discrimination on the basis of nationality to “sports teams”, but “in particular national 
teams”. Regardless of such language, there are no examples of practical application of the rule 
in sports outside of the nationality requirement for composition of national representative 
teams, and the Court has never used it in any other context. Advocate General was conscious 
of the difficulty in determining whether a pacer and a stayer in Walrave could constitute a 
“national team” and advised the Court to avoid giving the national court guidance on that 
concept. In following his advice the Court created “uncertainties that have plagued the 
application of EU rules to sport ever since.”74 On the basis of this it can be assumed that the 
purely sporting rule exception is confined to a single sporting rule.  
 
Second, the developments in EU sport jurisprudence since Walrave and Donà rulings, in terms 
of treatment of specificities of sport, as well as the introduction of Article 165(1) TFEU by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, renders the purely sporting rule exception entirely superfluous. Paragraph 8 
of Walrave can be taken as objective justification because the process of arriving at the 
conclusion that a certain sporting rule is “purely sporting”, within the meaning of Walrave and 
Donà judgements, entails the process that is “not unlike that of objective justification”.75 Sports 
federations have to demonstrate that the rule producing economic effect is objectively justified 
by reference to its purely sporting nature and an absence of economic motives (regardless of its 
economic effects), and that it is “limited to its proper objectives”, which is a reference to 
proportionality requirement. This will render any rule that can pass the purely sporting rule test 
compatible with the general EU law under objective justification framework. Justifications 
which certainly belong to the notion of specificity of the sport can be put forth, and provided 
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the rule is not disproportionate, it will pass the objective justification test. It must be reiterated 
that this conclusion is enabled by the unorthodox approach in the Court’s sports law 
jurisprudence that allows a non-exhaustive list of judicially developed justifications to be 
utilised for directly discriminatory rules. Standard approach is to allow only the Treaty-based 
derogations (public security, public policy and public health) for directly discriminatory 
measures. 
 
Third, although functional parallels may be drawn between purely sporting rule and Articles 
45(4) and 51 TFEU that safeguard certain types of directly discriminatory rules by providing 
exceptions for employment in public service and exercise of official authority, respectively, 
paragraph 27 of Meca-Medina has put an end to any such comparison. It states that “the mere 
fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope 
of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which has 
laid it down”. In Weatherill’s interpretation of this paragraph, the so-called rule of “purely 
sporting interest”, originating in Walrave, has been eliminated as a basis for immunising sports 
rules which have an economic effect from review under EU law.76 He then correctly pointed 
out that the vast majority of rules adopted by sporting federations produce such economic effect, 
but that this does not mean that they will be held incompatible with the EU law after assessment. 
In the view advanced by this article, the outcome of such assessment hinges upon satisfying the 
objective justification/Meca-Medina test. 
By holding that exclusion of foreign players from “national teams”, and later in Donà from 
“participation in certain matches”, falls outwith the scope of the Treaty, the Court attempted to 
remove purely sporting rules out of the general EU law and appeared to have created a novel 
exemption. But there exist clear advantages in terms of simplicity and legal certainty in 
discarding the category II exception and relocating the purely sporting rules under the well-
established analytical structure, and this is now supported by paragraph 27 of Meca-Medina. 
 
Finally, in the Commission Staff Working Document, Annex I, “purely sporting” rules are also 
contained in the notion of inherent rules under competition provisions, which apply to a much 
broader category of organisational sporting rules.77 Specifically, the Commission considered 
that the “purely sporting” rule from Walrave would likely meet the Meca-Medina test.78 This 
point could have been more strongly stated to reflect the idea that a rule that survives the purely 
sporting rules test will necessarily also pass the Meca-Medina test. Regulatory rules in sport 
that can be justified on the basis of “purely sporting” interests (or motives), within the meaning 
of Walrave and Donà judgments, automatically furnish the required public policy objectives 
under the Meca-Medina test, whereas the considerations that apply in evaluation of 
proportionality of such rules would remain the same under both analytical structures. This line 
of logic also applies to “purely sporting” rule as being capable of automatically satisfying the 
objective justification test in the free movement area. The concept of specificity of sport that is 
recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court and set out in Article 165(1) TFEU is a guarantee 
that nationality discrimination in national representative teams can be properly safeguarded in 
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the objective justification/Meca-Medina frameworks. Proportionality limb in the analysis is all-
encompassing tool that can balance legitimate public interest objectives against economic 
freedoms, while taking account of the specific characteristics of sport and its social and 
educational function within the meaning of Article 165(1) TFEU and paragraph 40 of Bernard 
on the one hand, and the free market requirements on the other.   
 
4.2. Inherent rules as objectively justified rules 
 
The inherent rule framework and objective justification framework overlap, and what 
constitutes inherent as opposed to objectively justified rule is a matter of rather futile distinction 
exclusive to internal market. Namely, the rules are analysed under two formally distinct 
analytical structures that will in either case produce identical outcomes in all factual situations 
when inherent rules are tested under objective justification framework. It is therefore submitted 
that rather than assisting the discourse of the law in any substantive terms, the nuances are 
strictly confined to form and as such they should not be maintained. The notion of inherent rule 
should be discarded.  
The sole obstacle to unifying the inherent rule and objective justification framework in internal 
market lies in the treatment of sporting rules that affect market access and discriminatory rules 
on the one hand, and non-discriminatory sporting rules that affect the exercise of economic 
activity on the other. The Court in Deliège considered that selection rules which limited the 
number of participants in the high-level international competitions, and which did not involve 
national teams competing against each other, could not in themselves constitute restrictions on 
the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU because “such a limitation is inherent 
in the conduct of an international high-level sports event, which necessarily involves certain 
selection rules or criteria being adopted”.79 What exactly will constitute such inherent rule as 
opposed to a non-discriminatory rule that affect exercise of economic activity that is not 
inherent, is a question left opened. Would transfer windows in Lehtonen be considered inherent, 
had they not been discriminatory? Presumably, they would still be assessed under objective 
justification framework as they relate to the “essential purpose of a professional player’s 
activity”. But arguably, so do rules that prevent athletes from participating in Olympic Games 
like in Deliège. It could be thought that selection criteria for judokas that are formally classified 
as amateurs, in fact produces more profound impact on athletes, than a rule on transfer windows 
which is easy to comply with and is not overly restrictive.  
Any other similar attempt to separate inherent rules and objectively justified rules in concrete 
terms will be unhelpful in practice and therefore unconvincing. Instead, it should simply be 
acknowledged that the inherent rules in fact go through the same analytical points as objectively 
justified rules, and that the two formally distinct analytical frameworks will always produce the 
same outcome. Thus, under the three-step objective justification test the Deliège selection 
criteria that enables national associations to send their best athletes to participate in high-level 
sports event would be considered restrictive on non-selected athletes, but objectively justified 
by the need for proper organisation of sport. It would also fulfil proportionality test because it 
was based on objective criteria and necessary (i.e., it was the least restrictive measure to attain 
the goals of the said justification). Parrish and Miettinen were of the opinion that “[a]lthough 
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inherent rules do not constitute restrictions within the meaning of free movement law, the 
process of analysis involves an examination of proportionality of the rule and the relationship 
between fundamental rights and the rule purported to be inherent.”80  
 
In competition law under Meca-Medina framework, the distinction does not exist: rules that 
affect market access and discriminatory rules, as well as non-discriminatory sporting rules that 
affect the exercise of economic activity, are subject to the same assessment criteria. Therefore, 
the final element in constructing the uniform framework is the convergence between internal 
market objective justification framework and Meca-Medina test in competition law. The 
instruction from Annex I of the Commission Staff Working Document is that, had the transfer 
periods in Lehtonen been proportionate, they would have been objectively justified not only 
under free movement law, but also under Meca-Medina test under Articles 101(1) and 102 
TFEU.81 Advocate General Albert in Lehtonen similarly concluded that transfer periods are 
compatible with Article 101 TFEU to the extent that they may be reconciled with freedom of 
movement for workers.82 Significantly, this position by the Commission and the Advocate 
General is also an implicit reference to convergence between internal market and competition 
provisions in their application to regulatory rules in sport.  
Both in law and in fact, objectively justified sporting rules under internal market law inevitably 
satisfy the Meca-Medina test under competition law and vice-versa, as they contain the same 
analytical points.83 On the other hand, whereas inherent rules under internal market will always 
satisfy the Meca-Medina test under competition law, the reverse will not always be true: 
discriminatory rules and rules affecting market access cannot satisfy the inherent rules test in 
internal market, and objective justification framework will apply only to produce the same 
result as under Meca-Medina test. Creating these structural obstacles to unifying the tests for 
regulatory rules in sport across the TFEU economic provisions, does not make much sense in 
terms of practical benefits or substance, and it is another reason why inherent rule test in internal 
market should be discarded. In Communication on Developing European Dimension in Sport 
the EU Commission more generally explained that in order to assess the compatibility of 
sporting rules with any EU law, it considers the legitimacy of the objectives pursued by the 
rules, whether any restrictive effects of those rules are inherent in the pursuit of the objectives 
and whether they are proportionate to them.84 First, every inherent rule does in fact pursue a 
legitimate aim and must be proportionate. In the Commission practice and the case law of the 
Court, including the opinions of the Advocate Generals, “inherent” is a synonym for 
“indispensable”, “necessary”, or “essential”. Inherency can also be seen as one part of a full 
proportionality test, which includes an assessment of suitability (a measure is suitable, if it is 
capable of achieving the goal both legally and factually), inherency or necessity (a measure is 
inherent/necessary if, without taking these measures, the legitimate objective cannot be 
achieved), and proportionality (a measure is proportionate if does not go beyond what is 
necessary, and there are no less restrictive rules that are capable of achieving the same 
objective). This proportionality test is applied to sporting cases in accordance with the standard 
set out in paragraph 40 of Bernard that refers to Art 165(1) TFEU. The broad and flexible 
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assessment criteria contained therein are capable of nourishing any special characteristic of 
sport in application of TFEU economic provisions. It is therefore a simple but powerful tool 
that can ensure the optimal application of EU law which perfectly balances economic and 
sporting considerations.  
 
4.3. Convergence and burden of proof 
 
Elsewhere, I have argued that there is a high degree of convergence between internal market 
and competition law in their application to regulatory rules in sport.85 Specifically, there is a 
full convergence between the free movement objective justification framework and the 
competition law Meca-Medina test, and the results are transplantable from one area to another 
without the need for separate analysis: the analytical points are the same in both tests. This is 
subject to two narrow exceptions that have already been discussed in Section 3.2 in the context 
of purely sporting rules. First, there is no convergence in regard to EU constitutional 
competence to act due to some very individual features of each set of norms, such as wholly 
internal situations under free movement provisions which do not preclude the application of 
competition law, or the requirement of appreciability under competition provisions which does 
not exist in internal market law. Similarly, there is no convergence as regards certain elements 
necessary to trigger the application of specific article, such as the concept of undertaking, 
agreement or decision, service, etc. Second, as per implications by the Court in paragraph 31 
of Meca-Medina, in case of the unlikely existence of hard-core restrictions by regulatory rules 
under Article 101(1) TFEU convergence does not apply. This in turns means that the rules that 
satisfy the required criteria for the application of both sets of provisions and do not constitute 
hard-core restrictions under Article 101(1) TFEU (which is the most likely scenario in practice) 
will be subject to one uniform test only.  
 
The only technical objection that can be raised to the proposed uniform test pertains to the 
burden of proof. Namely, under the first paragraph of Article 101 TFEU the burden is on the 
complainant, and in the third paragraph the burden is borne by the respondent.86 In free 
movement law, and under Article 102 TFEU, it is on the complainant to prove the existence of 
the restriction, while it is on respondent to prove that the restriction is objectively justified and 
proportionate. This sits uncomfortably with the Meca-Medina test that entirely falls within the 
scope of first paragraph of Article 101 TFEU, and as such demands the complainant to 
substantiate all the analytical points to the requisite standard of proof. Perhaps even more 
curiously, Meca-Medina test applies also in Article 102 TFEU. However, in Michelin II the 
General Court was unequivocal that the burden of proof for elements of the objective 
justification defence in Article 102 TFEU, a functional and substantive equivalent of Article 
101(1) ancillary restraints, was on the respondent dominant undertaking.87 Also the Discussion 
Paper addressed this issue and said that 
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[e]xclusionary conduct may escape the prohibition of Article [102] in case the dominant 
undertaking can provide an objective justification for its behaviour or it can demonstrate that its 
conduct produces efficiencies which outweigh the negative effect on competition. The burden 
of proof for such an objective justification or efficiency defence will be on the dominant 
company. It should be for the company invoking the benefit of a defence against a finding of an 
infringement to demonstrate to the required legal standard of proof that the conditions for 
applying such defence are satisfied. 
The burden of proof therefore shifts to the dominant undertaking when relying on the efficiency 
defence in Article 102 TFEU, equivalent to Article 101(3) TFEU, or the objective justification 
defence in Article 102 TFEU, equivalent to the Meca-Medina, Wouters and DLG style of 
exceptions under Article 101(1) TFEU. For the sake of convergence between the two 
competition law provisions, which is indispensable to maximise the rationality of applying the 
Meca-Medina test equally to both competition provisions, the structure of Article 101 TFEU 
should not be allowed to impede the utility of having the shared test. Doing otherwise could 
bring about bizarre outcomes in which a complainant is not successful in evidencing the 
disproportionality of the challenged rules under Article 101(1) TFEU, whereas the respondent 
is not successful in evidencing their proportionality under Article 102 TFEU. Also, if the 
complainant is the one that should prove all the elements of the Meca-Medina test, how could 
it be expected that the complainant should know what particular objective the rules were 
designed to protect by the governing body? For example, a complaint to the Commission 
pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 is drafted without any knowledge of the respondent’s 
(subsequent) submission.  
Prima facie, arguing for the reversed burden of proof in Article 101(1) TFEU seems to go 
against paragraph 55 of Meca-Medina and Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003.88 On a more careful 
examination, Recital 5 of that regulation explains that in the effective enforcement of EU 
competition law, which respects the “fundamental rights of defence”, the burden of proof under 
Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU should be on the authority alleging infringement, but then it goes 
on to say that the burden of proof “should be for the undertaking or association of undertakings 
invoking the benefit of a defence against a finding of an infringement to demonstrate to the 
required legal standard that the conditions for applying such defence are satisfied.” This could 
conceivably be interpreted as allowing for the reversal of burden of proof. Outside of pure 
structural considerations it should not matter under which paragraph of Article 101 TFEU the 
defence takes place, the burden of proof should be on the party seeking to rely on the defence. 
Meca-Medina test in fact represents not a sward for complainant, but a shield for respondent, 
and as such constitutes critical part of the respondent’s defence when their regulatory sporting 
rules have been challenged. Public interest objectives often cannot be translated into economic 
efficiencies so as to enable defence under Article 101(3) TFEU. This interpretation would, 
moreover, coincide and align the approach with that under the free movement provisions. For 
these reasons, in the light of the blurring divide between addressees of competition and internal 
market provisions and the pressing need to specify the parameters of convergence, it is 
submitted that the Court should re-examine paragraph 55 of Meca-Medina in which it implied 
                                                 
88 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 OJ L 1, 04.01.2003, p 1–25. Art. 2 reads: “in any 
national or Community proceedings for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, the burden of proving 
an infringement of Article 81(1) or of Article 82 of the Treaty shall rest on the party or the authority alleging the 
infringement. The undertaking or association of undertakings claiming the benefit of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
shall bear the burden of proving that the conditions of that paragraph are fulfilled.” 
that the burden is on appellants to establish that rules were disproportionate.89 Examination of 
the regulatory and organisational sporting rules does not follow the orthodox analytical 
approach under Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU, whereas Article 2 of the Regulation 1/2003 was 
drafted with that approach in mind. When dealing with private regulatory bodies such as 
sporting organisations where it is clear that both internal market and competition provisions 
apply to the same cases, this should not be allowed to create unnecessary additional confusion 
and futile differences.  
 
The key function of the burden of proof is to identify the party that is required to establish 
evidence to the requisite standard of proof. At the same time, there is no standard of proof in 
EU competition law that is defined ex ante in terms of probabilities, and identifying it in the 
judgements appears to be rather an ex post construction by commentators.90 The Court’s 
approach to standard of proof therefore seems to be largely impressionistic, as confirmed in 
paragraph 41 of Tetra Laval.91 Furthermore, according to Recital 5 of the Regulation 1/2003, 
national laws govern the matters of standard of proof when EU competition laws are applied 
by national courts and authorities. As such, it is a concept that fluctuates depending on the 
applicable national procedural law. In the EU, however, standard of proof is not a matter of 
procedure but of fact, and as such cannot be challenged on appeal.  
 
Against this background, it becomes apparent that there are no particular advantages in 
preserving the current formal approach to burden of proof. It is a purely structural choice based 
on the rigid distinction between prohibition provision and exemption provision in Article 101 
TFEU, which, for the sake of comparison, does not even exist in many legal systems. Choosing 
form over benefits such as efficiency, simplicity and convergence, serves neither any practical 
purpose nor competition law objectives any better than the reversed burden of proof. This 
outstanding aspect is therefore suitable for convergence in the application of the competition 




Nuances created by the Court in its structural approach to regulatory rules in sport might have 
been warranted when the EU sports law and policy was an emerging and novel discipline in 
search of itself. However, this legal area as it stands today can no longer justify the distinctions 
made in the formative phase. The general EU law parameters applicable to any industry are 
perfectly apt to accommodate all of the identified categories of regulatory rules in sport. Those 
parameters consist of a simple, all-encompassing uniform framework based on restriction – 
justification – proportionality analysis, as accompanied by considerations enshrined in the 
concept of specificities of sports. Therefore, there exists no credible reason to maintain purely 
                                                 
89 In paragraph 55 of C-519/04 Meca-Medina the Court held: “Since the appellants have, moreover, not pleaded 
that the penalties which were applicable and were imposed in the present case are excessive, it has not been 
established that the anti-doping rules at issue are disproportionate.” 
90 A.-L. Sibony, “Le juge et le raisonnement économique en droit de la concurrence”, L.G.D.J. (2008), at 746, 
cited in Gippini-Fournier, “The Elusive Standard of Proof in EU Competition Cases”, 33 World Competition 
(2010), pp 187–207, at 4.  
91 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR I-987. It was held that the evidentiary requirements 
placed on the Commission so not create a condition relating to the requisite standard of proof, but merely draw 
attention to essential function of evidence which is to establish convincingly the merits of an argument. 
sporting rules and inherent rules categories of sporting exception. The remaining two 
categories, sporting rules that produce no economic effect and objectively justified sporting 
rules, already fit into the ordinary EU law structure. The first one applies to any industry as 
economic effect is a constitutional requirement for Union action based on principles of conferral 
and subsidiarity enshrined in Article 5(1) TEU. The second one stems from the Court’s internal 
market jurisprudence and contains all the elements needed to analyse any sporting rule that 
produces economic effect. It supplies a clear set of coherent rules that are designed to protect 
the Union’s economic goals and at the same time nourish any specificities of sport in a 
balancing act of competing interests. In this context, proportionality principle as set out 
in Bernard and Article 165(1) TFEU is a powerful two-way filter: on the one hand, it will only 
allow economic considerations to prevail where the sporting rules are overly restrictive, or not 
restrictive enough, for the attainment of the legitimate goals. On the other hand, well-designed 
sporting rules that restrict economic freedoms will escape the condemnation under EU internal 
market and competition laws to the extent that they are suitable and necessary for their 
legitimate goals. 
Convergence between the internal market and competition laws assists the single uniform 
framework and eliminates the need for identical duplicate analysis. It applies in all cases where 
the rules of sports regulatory bodies that are being challenged under both sets of provisions 
fulfil the required economic effect respectively. The operation of presumptions in competition 
law in cases of hard-core restrictions is the only exception to this statement. 
A number of benefits flow from thus unified approach that heavily relies on Bernard/Article 
165(1) TFEU standard of proportionality assessment. They include simplification of analytical 
structure, enhanced certainty for sports governing bodies, and sufficient flexibility for both 
national and Union enforcers. Therefore, it is to be hoped that the Court will recognise these 
advantages and adopt uniform algorithm in its evaluation of regulatory rules in sporting 
industry. 
